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Abstract 
In 1991, after a long period of politicized lending to state-owned businesses known as 
parastatals, Tanzania set out to reform its financial system by legalizing private financial 
institutions and cleaning up state-owned banks. As part of this effort, Tanzania established 
the Loans and Advances Realization Trust (LART) to acquire nonperforming assets from 
state-owned banks in exchange for government bonds. Following these transfers, the 
Tanzanian government then recapitalized the transferring institutions. LART’s mandate was 
to recover outstanding amounts on nonperforming assets and to help debtors restructure to 
facilitate repayment. To enhance LART’s ability to make recoveries, Tanzanian authorities 
established a special LART Loan Recovery Tribunal with simplified procedures and exclusive 
jurisdiction over transferred assets. Tanzanian authorities initially established LART with a 
five-year timeframe, subject to a one-year extension. In 1996, Tanzania amended the 
legislation establishing LART to include private financial institutions and extend its 
operations to June 30, 2000, with the possibility of two one-year extensions. During its 
lifetime, LART acquired approximately TSh 85 billion ($96 million) in nonperforming 
assets—TSh 27 billion initially after its establishment and a further TSh 58 billion in 1996. 
By the time LART concluded its operations in January 2001, it had recovered approximately 
TSh 33 billion. 
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modules considering broad-based asset management company programs. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at    
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At a Glance 
 In 1967, the recently formed nation of 
Tanzania nationalized its banking system 
pursuant to a declaration issued by its 
socialist government (Nord et al. 2009).  
Government ownership of both financial 
institutions and state-controlled 
businesses known as parastatals resulted 
in bank lending based on political 
considerations rather than 
creditworthiness (Chijoriga 2000; Nord et 
al. 2009). With a shift toward liberalization 
beginning in the mid-1980s, parastatals 
faced increased competition and the loss of 
government subsidies. This change 
resulted in mounting losses at the state-
owned banks that the government had 
directed to lend to the parastatals (Nord et 
al. 2009). According to a report on 
Tanzania’s banking system released in 
1990, nonperforming loans comprised up 
to 45% of the total loan portfolio at the 
primary state-owned commercial bank, the 
National Bank of Commerce (Chijoriga 
2000). A 1991 estimate put that figure as 
high as 70% (Johnson et al. 1999). 
Against this backdrop, Tanzania in 1991 set 
out to reform its financial system by 
legalizing private financial institutions and 
cleaning up state-owned banks (Nord et al. 
2009). To accomplish this goal, Tanzanian 
authorities sought and received technical 
and financial assistance from the World 
Bank, the African Development Fund, and 
other international donors (ADF 2000). In 
pursuit of its goal of cleaning up state-owned banks, Tanzania established the Loans and 
Advances Realization Trust (LART) in 1991 as an autonomous government-owned 
institution (Johnson et al. 1999; LART Act 1991). Under its authorizing legislation, LART 
directed financial institutions to transfer their nonperforming assets to LART at a price it 
determined (LART Act 1991). Institutions received government bonds in exchange for the 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To hold the nonperforming assets of banks 
and to “take such action as may be necessary to 
recover all amounts outstanding in respect of such . . . 
assets, and to advise, direct or facilitate the measures 
that have to be taken by or in respect of the debtors 
so as to enhance their capacity to repay” (LART Act 
1991). 
Launch Dates   Announcement:  1991 
First transfer: 1992 
Wind-Down 
Dates 
Initially, December 31, 1995;  later 
extended to January 31, 2001 




45% to 70% of the total loan 
portfolio at the primary state-
owned commercial bank 
Commercial loans to state-
controlled businesses 
Program Size Not specified at outset 
Eligible 
Institutions 
State-owned financial institutions 
initially; later expanded to include 
private financial institutions 
Open-bank only 
Usage TSh 85 billion (approx. 
$96 million) transferred (approx. 
5% of GDP) (Nord et al. 2009) 
Outcomes Approx. TSh 33 billion recovered 






Special tribunal with exclusive 
jurisdiction over transferred 
assets to facilitate recoveries 
Tanzanian Loans and Advances 
Realization Trust (LART) 
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transferred assets. Following these transfers, the Tanzanian government then recapitalized 
the transferring institutions (ADF 2000). 
LART’s mandate was to recover outstanding amounts on nonperforming assets and to help 
debtors restructure to facilitate repayment (LART Act 1991). To enhance LART’s ability to 
make recoveries, Tanzanian authorities established a special LART Loan Recovery Tribunal 
with simplified procedures and exclusive jurisdiction over transferred assets (LART Act 
1991; Nord et al. 2009). 
The legislation establishing LART created a board of trustees that was responsible for 
governing it. The president of Tanzania appointed the chairman of this board, who was 
joined by four to six other members appointed by the minister of finance. An “administrator” 
appointed by the minister of finance had authority over the day-to-day operations of LART, 
subject to oversight from the board (LART Act 1991). 
Tanzanian authorities initially established LART with a five-year timeframe, subject to a one-
year extension. In 1996, Tanzania amended the legislation establishing LART to include 
private financial institutions and extend its operations to June 30, 2000, with the possibility 
of two one-year extensions (LART Act 1996). 
During its lifetime, LART acquired approximately TSh 85 billion ($96 million)3 in 
nonperforming assets—TSh 27 billion initially after its establishment and a further 
TSh 58 billion in 1996 (Johnson et al. 1999). The National Bank of Commerce accounted for 
around 70% of these assets, with the remaining assets coming from other state-owned 
financial institutions including the Tanzania Investment Bank, the Tanzania Housing Bank, 
and the Cooperative and Rural Development Bank (Chijoriga 2000). By the time LART 
concluded its operations in January 2001, it had recovered approximately TSh 33 billion 
(Johnson et al. 1999; World Bank 2001). 
Summary Evaluation 
While there has been little evaluation of LART, a report by the World Bank (2001) concluded 
that “LART’s strong management, professional staff, operational autonomy, and the ability 
to move collection cases rapidly through a dedicated court, which was funded by the 
Government, enabled LART to effectively and satisfactorily carry out its mandate.” Tripp 
(1997) argues that bureaucratic infighting between LART and the Parastatal Sector Reform 
Commission, a separate government body established by Tanzanian authorities to promote 
the divestiture of state-owned businesses, hampered privatization efforts. 
  
 
3 Exchange rate of approximately 888 TSh to $1 provided by World Bank 2001. 
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Tanzanian Loans and Advances Realization Trust: Tanzania Context 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to 
USD) 
$4.26 billion in 1990 
$4.96 billion in 1991 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to 
USD) 
$174 in 1990 
$196 in 1991 
Sovereign credit rating (5-year senior 
debt) 
 
Data not available for 1990–91 
Size of banking system 
 
$0.91 billion in 1990 
$1.07 billion in 1991 
Size of banking system as a percentage of 
GDP 
 
21.4% in 1990 
21.6% in 1991 
Size of banking system as a percentage of 
financial system 
 
Data not available for 1990–91 
5-bank concentration of banking system 
 
Data not available for 1990–91 
Foreign involvement in banking system No foreign involvement as of 1989 
Government ownership of banking system 100% government-owned as of 1989 
Existence of deposit insurance No in 1990–91 
Sources: Bloomberg; IMF 1996.  
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Key Design Decisions 
1. Part of a Package: Tanzanian authorities established LART as the first step in a 
two-step process that also involved recapitalizing the financial institutions from 
which LART acquired nonperforming assets. 
Institutions transferred nonperforming assets to LART when and as directed by LART (LART 
Act 1991). Following these transfers, the Tanzanian government then recapitalized the 
transferring institutions (ADF 2000). It does not appear that LART itself was responsible for 
the recapitalizations. 
2. Legal Authority: The Tanzanian Parliament adopted the Loans and Advances 
Realization Trust Act (the LART Act) in 1991 in order to establish LART and 
amended the LART Act in 1996 to expand LART’s mandate. 
Parliament amended the LART Act in 1996 to include private financial institutions and 
extend LART’s timeframe until at least 2000 (LART Act 1996). 
3. Special Powers: The LART Act also established the LART Loan Recovery Tribunal 
with simplified procedures and exclusive jurisdiction over transferred assets in 
order to accelerate recovery. 
At the time of LART’s establishment, legal proceedings involving nonperforming assets took 
anywhere from one to five years (World Bank 2001). To accelerate the pace of recovery, the 
LART Act created a special LART Loan Recovery Tribunal with simplified procedures and 
exclusive jurisdiction over transferred assets (LART Act 1991). This reduced hearing times 
to an average of three months (World Bank 2001). 
4. Mandates: LART’s mandates were to minimize losses and manage nonperforming 
assets by pursuing delinquent debtors and actively restructuring debtors if 
necessary to enhance their capacity to repay. 
The LART Act established LART to hold the nonperforming assets of banks and to “take such 
action as may be necessary to recover all amounts outstanding in respect of such . . . assets, 
and to advise, direct or facilitate the measures that have to be taken by or in respect of the 
debtors so as to enhance their capacity to repay” (LART Act 1991). 
5. Ownership Structure: LART was government-owned. 
The LART Act established LART as an autonomous government-owned institution (Johnson 
et al. 1999; LART Act 1991). 
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6. Governance/Administration: LART was governed by a board of trustees 
appointed by the president and minister of finance. 
The LART Act created a board of trustees that was responsible for governing LART. The 
president of Tanzania appointed the chairman of this board, who was joined by four to six 
other members appointed by the minister of finance. An “administrator” appointed by the 
minister of finance had authority over the day-to-day operations of LART, subject to 
oversight from the board (LART Act 1991). LART maintained a professional staff of 
approximately 20 people (World Bank 1999). 
7. Size: Tanzanian authorities do not appear to have established a specific cap on 
LART’s size. 
The LART Act contained no references to a cap on the amount of nonperforming assets that 
could be acquired by LART (LART Act 1991). 
8. Funding Source: The Tanzanian government funded LART. 
The Tanzanian government incurred significant costs from LART’s operations and the 
related recapitalization of transferring financial institutions. It was anticipated that these 
costs would be outweighed in the long run by benefits in the form of “the savings on the 
subsidies that would have otherwise been provided to loss-making banks, and the 
incremental fiscal revenues from the earnings of profitable financial institutions and higher 
economic growth” (ADF 2000). 
9. Eligible Institutions: Initially, LART purchased assets from state-owned 
institutions being recapitalized, with private financial institutions ultimately 
being made eligible in 1996. 
The 1996 amendment to the LART Act expanded eligibility to private financial institutions, 
which had been made legal again as part of the financial system reforms launched in 1991 
(LART Act 1996; Nord et al. 2009). It does not appear that any private financial institutions 
participated. 
10. Eligible Assets: Initially, only nonperforming assets held by state-owned financial 
institutions at the time LART was established were eligible for participation. 
The LART Act provided that the nonperforming assets eligible for transfer were those (a) in 
existence as of the commencement of the LART Act or (b) in existence as of December 30, 
1990 (subject to extension to December 31, 1991), provided that they were on the books of 
the institution as of June 30, 1988 (LART Act 1991). The 1996 amendment to the LART Act 
expanded eligibility to all assets determined to be nonperforming consistent with regulatory 
guidance (LART Act 1996). The nonperforming assets transferred to LART consisted largely 
of commercial loans to state-controlled businesses. 
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11. Acquisition – Mechanics: Eligible financial institutions transferred 
nonperforming assets when directed to do so by LART and received government 
bonds as consideration. 
Under the LART Act, LART provided written direction to financial institutions requiring them 
to transfer nonperforming assets (LART Act 1991). Financial institutions that transferred 
nonperforming assets at the direction of LART received government bonds as consideration. 
These bonds carried interest rates of 11% and had maturities of 20 years or more (ADF 
2000). 
12. Acquisition – Pricing: LART determined the price to be paid for transferred 
assets, but it is unclear how it did so or what its determinations were. 
The LART Act provided that LART would pay for transferred assets “such sums as may be 
determined by [LART] at such rate, in such form and subject to such other terms and 
conditions as [LART] may determine” (LART Act 1991). It is not clear from program 
documents exactly what price LART determined should be paid or how this price was 
determined. 
13. Management and Disposal: Initially, LART focused on seizing and selling assets 
in order to achieve recoveries. 
Initially LART made most of its recoveries on nonperforming assets via seizure and sale of 
assets (Johnson et al. 1999). Ultimately, LART employed a broader array of approaches 
including “direct recovery of outstanding liabilities, rescheduling of assets, negotiated 
settlement, packaging of assets to facilitate disposition, and auctions” (World Bank 2001). 
14. Timeframe: Tanzanian authorities initially established LART with a five-year 
timeframe ending on December 31, 1995 with the option for a one-year 
extension before further extending the program into 2001. 
The LART Act provided for a five-year timeframe for the program, with the option for a one-
year extension (LART Act 1991). The 1996 amendment to the LART Act extended this 
timeframe until June 30, 2000, with the option for two one-year extensions (LART Act 1996). 
The program ultimately concluded in January 2001 (World Bank 2001). 
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